In June 1942, in full World War, Adolf Hitler made an unexpected visit in Finland. The surprise was all the hosts, who, while they were at war with the USSR, did not want to be perceived by the Soviets as an ally of Nazi Germany's vassal. At the junction of two parts, a microphone "Lost" opened by the Finnish national radio will record a conversation with Hitler with the Marshal Mannerheim Casual. The main topic was the war against the USSR, and Romania's strategic importance for the Wehrmacht.
The pretext used by Hitler to go to Finland was the birthday of the Marshal and supreme commander of the Finnish armed forces, Carl Gustav Mannerheim. Taken aback by Hitler's visit, Finns have avoided to make them a levee Fuhrer. Finnish leaders have chosen a place for discussion a dining car that is near the military airport Immola in south-eastern Finland.
According to Finnish radio, the meeting lasted one hour and two parts. The first one, which had recorded the radio, Hitler gave a short speech and a toast in honor of Marshal Mannerheim. In the second part, were to have private discussions between Hitler and Mannerheim. But Hitler knew that they were recorded.
Recording made when she was kept secret until 2004 Finnish Radio archives.
Common enemy: the USSR
Coldness that was received Hitler Finland has another explanation. Much of the Finnish public was reluctant for a possible alliance with Germany. Finns were expected Hitler to propose a joint offensive against the USSR, which flagrantly violate the line adopted by the Finnish leadership not fighting on Soviet territory. Moreover, Finland does not want to lose capital and international goodwill that it won from Soviet attack.
On the other side, the visit to Finland, Hitler probably wanted to ensure that Finland will continue to fight against the Soviets taking the place of Red Army troops that otherwise could be transferred to fight against Germany. It is possible that Hitler Finnish officials proposed to be a stronger involvement in the war against the USSR, but they have refused. For registration, which ends abruptly, but such discussion is missing.
Military context of the visit
After the great counteroffensive launched by Russian forces on December 5, 1941, on the Eastern Front, German troops were pushed back towards Moscow from the city of Smolensk. Russian offensive was halted with heavy losses by the German army in February 1942, just one hundred kilometers from Smolensk. Red Army was able to recapture Rostov city, point of great strategic importance.
Encouraged by successful winter counteroffensive, Stalin decides to launch a new offensive on German positions at May 12, 1942, in Kharkiv region. Russian offensive has focused on the area defended by the German Sixth Army led by Friedrich von Paulus. After some initial successes, the German offensive was stopped, they counterattacked. Through a pincers movement in the Kharkiv, Germans surrounded quarter of a million Russian soldiers. Despite desperate attempts to break the encirclement of Russia, 200,000 Russian soldiers taken prisoners in German hands.
In the summer of 1942, Hitler changed his goal. Conquest and occupation of oil resources in the Caucasus Stalingrad became the most important targets for the Wehrmacht, to the detriment of employment Moscow.
Hitler's analysis
The Finnish radio recording made public, Hitler made a pertinent analysis of the situation on the whole front. Recognize that would not be caught in a war on two fronts West and East. "Weather" forced to attack France in spring 1940 and autumn 1939 not, as would be desired. Another cause of delay in attacking the USSR was ... Italy. Difficulties encountered by Italian allies, both in Africa and (especially) in Albania and Greece were obliged each time to jump to help ally Germany, which led to a delay and a decrease in the Wehrmacht fighting force Eastern Front. Hitler states that he underestimated the strength and equipment of the Soviet army and that he wanted to attack the USSR since 1940. Decisive moment in this decision has been meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in August 1939.
The transcript starts with Hitler talking as follows, italics were used to emphasize the heightening of their voices in the original voice recording. I also have removed all the "uh's" and repeated words to make the dialog easier to read.
Hitler: ...a very serious danger, perhaps the most serious one - it's whole extent we can only now judge. We did not ourselves understand - just how strong this state [the USSR] was armed.
Mannerheim: No, we hadn't thought of this.
Hitler: No, I too, no.
Mannerheim: During the Winter War - during the Winter War we had not even thought of this. Of course...
Hitler: (Interrupting) Yes.
Mannerheim: But so, how they - in reality - and now there is no doubt all they had - what they had in their stocks!
Hitler: Absolutely, This is - they had the most immense armaments that, uh, people could imagine. Well - if somebody had told me that a country - with...(Hitler is interrupted by the sound of a door opening and closing.) If somebody had told me a nation could start with 35,000 tanks, then I'd have said: "You are crazy!"
Mannerheim: Thirty-five?
Hitler: Thirty-five thousand tanks.
Another Voice In Background: Thirty-five thousand! Yes!
Hitler: We have destroyed - right now - more than 34,000 tanks. If someone had told me this, I'd have said: "You!" If you are one of my generals had stated that any nation has 35,000 tanks I'd have said: "You, my good sir, you see everything twice or ten times. You are crazy; you see ghosts." This I would have deemed possible. I told you earlier we found factories, one of them at Kramatorskaja, for example, Two years ago there were just a couple hundred [tanks]. We didn't know anything. Today, there is a tank plant, where - during the first shift a little more than 30,000, and 'round the clock a little more than 60,000, workers would have labored - a single tank plant! A gigantic factory! Masses of workers who certainly, lived like animals and...
Another Voice In Background: (Interrupting) In the Donets area?
Hitler: In the Donets area. (Background noises from the rattling of cups and plates over the exchange.)
Mannerheim: Well, if you keep in mind they had almost 20 years, almost 25 years of - freedom to arm themselves...
Hitler: (Interrupting quietly) It was unbelievable.
Mannerheim: And everything - everything spent on armament.
Hitler: Only on armament.
Mannerheim: Only on armament!
Hitler: (Sighs) Only - well, it is - as I told your president [Ryte] before - I had no idea of it. If I had an idea - then I would have been even more difficult for me, but I would have taken the decision [to invade] anyhow, because - there was no other possibility. It was - certain, already in the winter of '39/ '40, that the war had to begin. I had only this nightmare - but there is even more! Because a war on two fronts - would have been impossible - that would have broken us. Today, we see more clearly - than we saw at that time - it would have broken us. And my whole - I originally wanted to - already in the fall of '39 I wanted to conduct the campaign in the west - on the continuously bad weather we experienced hindered us.
Our whole armament - you know, was - is a pure good weather armament. It is very capable, very good, but it is unfortunately just a good-weather armament. We have seen this in the war. Our weapons naturally were made for the west, and we all thought, and this was true 'till that time, uh, it was the opinion from the earliest times: you cannot wage war in winter. And we too, have, the German tanks, they weren't tested, for example, to prepare them for winter war. Instead we conducted trials to prove it was impossible to wage war in winter. That is a different starting point [than the Soviet's]. In the fall of 1939 we always faced the question. I desperately wanted to attack, and I firmly believed we could finish France in six weeks.
However, we faced the question of whether we could move at all - it was raining continuously. And I know the French area myself very well and I too could not ignore the opinions, of many of my generals that, we - probably - would not have had the élan, that our tank arm would not have been, effective, that our air force could not been effective from our airfields because of the rain.
I know northern France myself. You know, I served in the Great War for four years. And - so the delay happened. If I had in '39 eliminated France, then world history would have changed. But I had to wait 'till 1940, and unfortunately it wasn't possible before May. Only on the 10th of May was the first nice day - and on the 10th of May I immediately attacked. I gave the order to attack on the 10th on the 8th. And - then we had to, conduct this huge transfer of our divisions from the west to the east.
First the occupation of - then we had the task in Norway - at the same time we faced - I can frankly say it today - a grave misfortune, namely the - weakness of, Italy. Because of - first, the situation in North Africa, then, second, because of the situation in Albania and Greece - a very big misfortune. We had to help. This meant for us, with one small stoke, first - the splitting of our air force, splitting our tank force, while at the same time we were preparing, the, tank arm in the east. We had to hand over - with one stroke, two divisions, two whole divisions and a third was then added - and we had to replace continuous, very severe, losses there. It was - bloody fighting in the desert.
This all naturally was inevitable, you see. I had a conversation with Molotov [Soviet Minister] at that time, and it was absolutely certain that Molotov departed with the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed the decision to begin a war, and I dismissed him with the decision to - impossible, to forestall him. There was - this was the only - because the demands that man brought up were clearly aimed to rule, Europe in the end. (Practically whispering here.) Then I have him - not publicly...(fades out).
Already in the fall of 1940 we continuously faced the question, uh: shall we, consider a break up [in relations with the USSR]? At that time, I advised the Finnish government, to - negotiate and, to gain time and, to act dilatory in this matter - because I always feared - that Russia suddenly would attack Romania in the late fall - and occupy the petroleum wells, and we would have not been ready in the late fall of 1940. If Russia indeed had taken Romanian petroleum wells, than Germany would have been lost. It would have required - just 60 Russian divisions to handle that matter.
In Romania we had of course - at that time - no major units. The Romanian government had turned to us only recently - and what we did have there was laughable. They only had to occupy the petroleum wells. Of course, with our weapons I could not start a, war in September or October. That was out of the question. Naturally, the transfer to the east wasn't that far advanced yet. Of course, the units first had to reconsolidate in the west. First the armaments had to be taken care of because we too had - yes, we also had losses in our campaign in the west. It would have been impossible to attack - before the spring of 19, 41. And if the Russians at that time - in the fall of 1940 - had occupied Romania - taken the petroleum wells, then we would have been, helpless in 1941.
Another Voice In Background: Without petroleum...
Hitler: (Interrupting) We had huge German production: however, the demands of the air force, our Panzer divisions - they are really huge. It is level of consumption that surpasses the imagination. And without the addition of four to five million tons of Romanian petroleum, we could not have fought the war - and would have had to let it be - and that was my big worry. Therefore I aspired to, bridge the period of negotiations 'till we would be strong enough to, counter those extortive demands [from Moscow] because - those demands were simply naked extortion's. They were extortion's. The Russians knew we were tied up in the west. They could really extort everything from us. Only when Molotov visited - then - I told him frankly that the demands, their numerous demands, weren't acceptable to us. With that the negotiations came to an abrupt end that same morning.
There were four topics. The one topic that, involved Finland was, the, freedom to protect themselves from the Finnish threat, he said. [I said] You do not want to tell me Finland threatens you! But he said: "In Finland it is - they who take action against the, friends, of the Soviet Union. They would [take action] against [our] society, against us - they would continuously, persecute us and, a great power cannot be threatened by a minor country."
I said: "Your, existence isn't threatened by Finland! That is, you don't mean to tell me..."
Mannerheim: (Interrupting) Laughable!
Hitler: "...that your existence is threatened by Finland?" Well [he said] there was a moral - threat being made against a great power, and what Finland was doing, that was a moral - a threat to their moral existence. Then I told him we would not accept a further war in the Baltic area as passive spectators. In reply he asked me how we viewed our position in, Romania. You know, we had given them a guarantee. [He wanted to know] if that guarantee was directed against Russia as well? And that time I told him: "I don't think it is directed at you, because I don't think you have the intention of attacking Romania. You have always stated that Bessarabia is yours, but that you have - never stated that you want to attack Romania!"
"Yes," he told me, but he wanted to know more precisely if this guarantee...(A door opens and the recording ends.)
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